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Abstract
The paper discusses questions resulting from a study of the interac-
tion of a change of preferences and environmental policy. In a model with
pollution as a side eﬀect of consumption environmental policy is intro-
duced in the form of a consumption tax with or without a subsidy on
eco-friendly investments. In simulations we observe the dynamic behavior
of models before and after sudden changes of exogenous variables. These
shocks are jumps in the preference structure of individuals towards more
environmental-friendly or consumption-friendly attitudes. Additionally
we examine the eﬀect of a lagged reaction of the policy agents.
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1 Introduction
It’s no secret that considerations about the protection of the environment have
not only to take the welfare of individuals living today but also of yet unborn
generations into account. This turns out to be very complicated. In addition to
the diﬃculties resulting from uncertainty about the welfare of diﬀerent individ-
uals living today the changes of variables that are more or less constant in the
short run must be considered. Future tastes, technological developments and
even available resources are only a few examples. Nevertheless, in economics en-
vironmental policy is usually evaluated in static models and consequently these
variables are modelled as exogenously given. Some exceptions can be found
in literature on the interaction of environmental policy and economic growth.
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996), Forster
(1973), Gradus and Smulders (1993), Huang and Cai (1994), Lighthart and van
der Ploeg (1994) and Smulders and Gradus (1996) published fundamental stud-
ies. Conrad (1999) summarizes the literature on computable general equilibrium
models.
Bohm and Russell (1985) discuss among other criteria flexibility and dynamic
incentives of policy instruments. Flexibility is the facility to adjust the chosen
environmental policy instrument to changes of exogenous variables if a certain
environmental target level should be reached. Dynamic incentives of policy
instruments are eﬀects on the development of new technologies, on the impact
on relative factor prices and its consequences on locational decisions. In this
paper we tie up to the aspect of flexibility.
Using the model developed in Barthel (2005, 2007b) we explore the eﬀects
of shocks on the economy. In steady state equilibrium models, variables remain
constant or change with a (common) constant rate over time (Chiang (1984), p.
499). Here we investigate the consequences of a jump in the weight of environ-
mental quality in the utility.1 The apparent idea is of course the "greening" of
preferences. At least two reasons could be oﬀered to support this idea. At first
one could argue that new scientific knowledge leads to a more careful attitude
with regard to environmental problems. The second explanation is the so-called
environmental Kuznets curve. It is widely assumed - and it exists empirical
evidence - that after reaching a certain level of economic welfare indiduals focus
their demand increasingly on environmental quality and goods produced with
environmental-friendly technologies.
A development in the opposite direction, the blackening of preferences, is
probably not that evident. But there are several examples. Obviously with the
beginning of the industrialization process environmental concerns disappear in
favor of high growth rates of the economy. In some countries, the discovery
of new production and consumption possibilities is the reason for this trend,
whereas "keeping-up-with-the-Joneses" in other countries leads to a change of
preferences with respect to the environment.
1A similar idea was used by Hettich (2000). In a discrete formulation of the Uzawa-Lucas
growth model he discusses the impact of a shock towards greener preferences in a planned
economy.
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Besides a genuine change of preferences of the entire population the aggre-
gated preferences can also be altered by a shift of the income distribution. If we
assume diﬀerent attitudes toward environmental quality depending on income a
growing average income may result in rising demand for environmental quality
whereas an impoverishment of large fractions of the population may lead to a
disregard for environmental requirements. But since we do not explicitely deal
with distributional aspects of the problem and the aggregated eﬀect of a change
of the income distribution may be captured in concepts such as the Environ-
mental Kuznets Curve we abstain from a further discussion of the problem.
In the following we will deal with several solutions of the models. The
examination of the unregulated or market economy implies a decentralized op-
timization of the households and represents the resulting aggregated solution.
The optimal solution or the case of the planned economy assumes a mecha-
nism, e.g. a benevolent planner or dictator that ensures the internalization of
all external eﬀects in the process of optimization. The optimal environmental
policy is a combination of instruments resulting in a solution equivalent to the
optimal solution reached by a planner in the equilibrium but not necessarily on
the track to the equilibrium. Naturally, none of these solutions reflects any real
economy. Probably in all real economies the government tries to internalize at
least some of the external eﬀects but surely not all. Therefore, images of real
world economies could be found presumably between the extreme solutions we
find in our models. It is especially necessary to keep in mind that a planned
economy as defined here has nothing in common with planning known from
the so-called socialist countries. The aim of planning in these countries was
rarely the internalization of external eﬀects. On the contrary, planning was a
tool to reach a certain exogenously determined goal. Coincidentally, this could
be an optimal solution according to our understanding; in general it would be
something completely diﬀerent.
Usually it takes time before individuals’ preferences are perceived and before
they make history. Therefore, we will analyze the consequences of a lag in the
adjustment of environmental policy instruments to the new conditions.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce the basic
model. Section (3) discusses the impact of changes towards a greener preference
structure in models with or without environmental policy. Section (4) addresses
the eﬀect of blackening preferences. Section (5) investigates the consequences of
a delayed adjustment of environmental policy after a shock whereas Section (6)
deals with errors in the adjustment process. Section (7) summarizes the results
and gives a brief outlook on possible extensions and variations of the model.2
2 If the headlines sound familiar to you: "Save the Whales!", from Country Joe McDonald:
"Into the Fray", 1982; "Paint It Black", from The Rolling Stones: "Aftermath", 1966; "Big
Sleep", from Simple Minds: "New Gold Dream (81-82-83-84)", 1982; "On the Edge" from
Klaus Schulze: "History", 1988.
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2 The Basic Model
2.1 Environment
The environmental quality N (t) depends only on the flow of pollution. There
is no accumulation of pollutants. It is assumed that all pollutants that are
not eliminated due to environmental protection vanish in the next moment.
This is equal to a situation with infinite but somewhat lagged self-regenerating
capacity of the environment. Examples of pollutants of this type are noise, light
or malodor. The burden on the environment depends on the share of income
devoted to cleaning the environment or preventing pollution E (S). Pollution is
a damaging side eﬀect of consumption P (C). Without economic activity the
natural quality is N . It follows:
N = N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
with:
NE > 0 NP < 0
2.2 Households and Preferences
All n households are identical, especially of equal size, and small. The represen-
tative household exhibits preferences over consumption goods and environmen-
tal amenities. The size of the population is assumed to be constant. The rate
of time preference is ρ. The elasticity of substitution, σ, and the relative weight
of environmental amenities in utility, φ > 0, are constant. The utility function
of the individual household can be written as:
Wi =
Z ∞
0
U (ci, N, φ) · e−ρ·tdt (1)
with the household’s consumption being ci and environmental quality N . For
the average consumption and investment into the regenerative capacity of the
environment follows:
C =
nX
i=1
ci c =
C
n
S(N) =
nX
i=1
s(N)i s(N) =
S(N)
n
Households supply one unit of labor and receive a wage w. Each household
holds assets a with a rate of return r. Part of the household’s income can be
used to improve the regenerative capacity of environment. The endogenous rate
of these environmental expenditures is s(N). The remaining income can be used
for consumption c and saving a˙. The flow budget constraint for the household
is:
w + r · a = a˙+ c+ s(N) (2)
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The household’s optimization problem is to maximize (1) subject to the
budget constraint (2). As derived in Appendix 8.1 the control variables change
according to:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ3 · ξ2
· (ρ− r)
c
(3)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· (ρ− r)
s
(4)
with
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN · n ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UcN · PC ·NP · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡
(UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS ·NE + UNN ·E2S ·N2E + UN ·E2S ·NEE
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
For the change of the quality of nature we can write:
N˙ = NE ·ES · S˙ +NP · PC · C˙ (5)
= n · (NE ·ES · s˙+NP · PC · c˙)
2.3 Production
The technology to produce goods in this economy can be described by a linear-
homogenous production function with labor L and capital K in eﬃciency units.
Y = F (K,L) (6)
Since each of n households supplies one unit of labor and owns the same share
of total capital K it follows:
Y = F (K,n) = n · F
µ
K
n
, 1
¶
k ≡ K
L
f (k) ≡ F (k, 1)
Output per capita can be expressed by:
y ≡ Y
n
= f (k)
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The marginal productivities are then given by:
∂Y
∂K
= n · ∂f (k)
∂k
· 1
n
=
∂f (k)
∂k
∂Y
∂L
= f (k) + n · ∂f (k)
∂k
· ∂k
∂n
= f (k)− K
n
· ∂f (k)
∂k
Output is equal to the sum of the marginal productivities of the factors multi-
plied by the quantities:
Y =
∂Y
∂K
·K + ∂Y
∂L
· L
=
∂f (k)
∂Kn
·K +
∙
f (k)− K
n
· ∂f (k)
∂k
¸
· n
= f (k) · n
In equilibrium, supply and demand on capital and labor markets should be
equal. This results in factor payments equal to marginal productivities:
r =
∂Y
∂K
=
∂f (k)
∂k
w =
∂Y
∂L
= f (k)− k · ∂f (k)
∂k
Equilibrium on the capital market ensures that savings are equal to investments.
The total amount of capital equals the total amount of assets:
a · n = K
The interest rate, therefore, is equal to the marginal return to investment; the
wage rate is equal to the output per capita reduced by capital costs:
r =
∂f (a)
∂a
w = f (a)− a · ∂f (a)
∂a
In equilibrium, wage and interest rate depend consequently only on the size of
the capital stock. The household’s budget constraint can be written as:
a˙+ c+ s(N) = f (a)
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2.4 Steady State
In this model - with no other engine of growth than capital accumulation - a
steady state is characterized by constant variables. It follows:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ρ− r = 0
ρ = r (7)
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a)
Uc
UN
= NE ·ES −NP · PC (8)
a˙ = 0
c+ s(N) = w + r · a = f (a) (9)
For given parameter values, these equations allow to compute solutions for the
steady state values c∗, s∗ and a∗.
2.5 The Optimal Solution and a First-Best Policy
As a benchmark we derive the optimal solution of the model.3 The benevolent
dictator considers the trade-oﬀs between higher consumption and consequential
increased pollution and between expenditures for environmental quality and
lower consumption but higher environmental quality. The behavior of the sys-
tem can be described by:
g(a) ≡
a˙
a
=
f (a)− c− s(N)
a
(10)
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ2 − ξ3
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· ρ− fa
c
(11)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ2 − ξ1
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· ρ− fa
s
(12)
with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
∙
UN ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UNN ·N2P · P 2C
¸
· n2 + 2 · UcN · PC ·NP · n
UN ·NE ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN + UNN ·NP · PC · n
UN
+
NEP · PC · n
NE
ξ3 ≡
UNN ·NE ·ES · n
UN
+
NEE ·ES · n
NE
+
ESS · n
ES
3 See Appendix 8.2.
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The steady state of the optimal solution is characterized by:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ρ− fa = 0
ρ = fa (13)
Uc + UN ·NP · PC · n = UN ·NE ·ES · n = θ(a)
Uc
UN
= (NE ·ES −NP · PC) · n (14)
a˙ = 0
c+ s(N) = w + r · a = f (a) (15)
As a first-best policy we introduce a combination of taxes on consumption
and subsidies on environmental expenditures that ensure the optimal level of
consumption and environmental expenditures in the steady state.4 As a con-
sequence, the optimal quality of nature and the maximal utility level will be
reached. The budget constraint of household i is now given by:
wi + r · ai = (1 + d) · ci + (1− p) · s(N)i
The control variables change according to:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
(ξ5 − ξ2) · (ρ− r)− ξ3 · ξ5 · d˙+ ξ2 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
· 1
c
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
(ξ1 − ξ4) · (ρ− r) + ξ3 · ξ4 · d˙− ξ1 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
· 1
s
with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN ·
¡
NP · PCC +NPP · P 2C
¢ · n
+UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n+ UcN ·NP · PC · (n+ 1)
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡ −
1
1 + d
ξ4 ≡
(UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ5 ≡
¡
UN ·NE ·ESS + UNN ·N2E ·E2S + UN ·NEE ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ6 ≡
1
1− p
To run numerical simulations, we have to specify the general equations used
so far.
4See Appendix 8.3.
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2.6 Specific Functions for Numerical Simulations
2.6.1 Utility Function
The focus of the following analyses will be on models with a Cobb-Douglas
utility function that is characterized by an elasticity of substitution equal to
one (σ = 1):5
U = cα · (φ ·N)1−α (16)
2.6.2 Environmental Quality
For simplicity, the following function is chosen for the environmental quality:
N = N +E (S)− P (C) (17)
The relevant derivatives are now:
NE = 1
NP = −1
NEE = NPP = NEP = 0
We assume the followin impact of economic activities on natural quality:
E (S) = τ (S) · Sγ (18)
P (C) = τ (C) · Cβ (19)
0 < γ < 1 < β
0 ≤ τ (S), τ (C)
The relevant derivatives are:
ES = τ (S) · γ · Sγ−1 > 0 (20)
ESS = τ (S) · γ · (γ − 1) · Sγ−2 < 0 (21)
PC = τ (C) · β · Cβ−1 > 0 (22)
PCC = τ (C) · β · (β − 1) · Cβ−2 > 0 (23)
This implies decreasing marginal eﬀects of investments into environmental qual-
ity and increasing marginal damages due to consumption.
2.6.3 Production Function
We use a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = F (K,L) = A ·Kδ · L1−δ (24)
5The impact of the elasticity of substitution is discussed in Barthel (2005, 2007b).
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In the Cobb-Douglas case, output per head and interest rate are then given by:
y = A · kδ
r = δ ·A · kδ−1
It follows that the single equilibrium is determined by the parameters. The
equilibrium capital stock is given by:
k∗ =
µ
δ ·A
ρ
¶ 1
1−δ
The labor supply is one unit per head. In the economy there are n households.
This results in:
k = a
3 Save the Whales! The Impact of Greening
Preferences
With the specified functions we can rewrite condition (8) in the following way:
Uc = UN · (ES + PC)
It follows:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc − UN · PCC · n− UcN · PC · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C · n
UN ·ES
ξ2 ≡
(UcN − UNN · PC) · n
UN
ξ3 ≡
UcN − UNN · PC · n
UN
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS + UNN ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·ES
The path of the system is now determined by the equations:
g(c) ≡
c˙
c
=
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ3 · ξ2
· ρ− r
c
(25)
g(s) ≡
s˙
s
=
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· ρ− r
s
(26)
g(a) ≡
a˙
a
=
f (a)− c− s(N)
a
(27)
Initially, the following parameter values are used: A = 5, n = 1000, α = 0.75,
β = 1.1, γ = 0.9, δ = 0.5, ρ = 0.05, φ = 0.5, N = 1000, τ (S) = 5 and
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τ (C) = 0.05.6 Various methods can be used to find the correct initial value of
the control variables.7 However, we use the method of backward integration as
described by Brunner and Strulik (2002). The trajectories correspond to a time
path that approaches 99.5% of the equilibrium capital stock in t = 0.
3.1 Numerical Results for an Unregulated Market Econ-
omy
In this section we analyze the impact of a sudden change in preferences towards
increased environmental care. In t = 0, the parameter of the utility function
α jumps from 0.75 to 0.74, 0.70, 0.6 or 0.5. Thus, the range of the changes
goes from very small to remarkably large. The shocks are unanticipated - even
for consumers. But once the new parameter value is reached the change and
all of its consequences are common knowledge. There is no stochastic element
in the model. Consequently, sensible formation of expectations before t = 0 is
impossible.
Note that the dashed trajectories correspond to a reference scenario without
shocks.
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Figure 3.1: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74: assets, consumption, environmental
expenditures and environmental quality
6 In equilibrium, a rate of time preference of ρ = 0.05 results in an interest rate of r = 0.05.
This indicates a one-year period. The other parameter values are more or less arbitrarily
chosen provided that they fulfill the conditions mentioned above and result in a model that
can be solved numerically in reasonable time.
7For an overview see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), pp. 471-491.
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Figure 3.2: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74: growth rate of assets, consumption
and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 3.3: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income
The changes of variable values in the presented example are small except for
the jump in the quality of nature. With a more intense change of preferences,
the direction of the variable changes become more apparent.
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Table 3.1: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.75→ 0.74 0.010 0.034 5.412 0.205
0.75→ 0.70 0.046 0.174 28.611 1.729
0.75→ 0.60 0.111 0.548 100.125 10.758
0.75→ 0.50 0.147 1.004 200.176 29.307
As an illustration we show in the next figures the behavior of the system
after an enormous change of the preference parameter from 0.75 to 0.50. That
implies a jump of the value of environmental quality in t = 0 to about 300%.
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Figure 3.4: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50: assets, consumption, environmental
expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 3.5: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50: growth rate of assets, consumption
and environmental expenditures, and utility level
2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15
2488
2490
2492
2494
2496
2498
wêr
2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15124.65
124.75
124.8
124.85
124.9
124.95
r∗a
2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15124.65
124.75
124.8
124.85
124.9
124.95
w
2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15
0.05002
0.05004
0.05006
0.05008
0.05012
0.05014
r
Figure 3.6: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income
The increase in environmental quality is accompanied by increasing con-
sumption and increasing expenditures for environmental quality. This is pos-
sible since the change in the preference parameter makes it optimal to slow
down the economy. The increase of expenditures for environmental quality is
relatively higher; hence the rise of pollution can be compensated. The simul-
taneous increase of environmental quality and consumption causes a jump of
the utility level. The growth rates of capital, consumption and environmental-
14
friendly expenditures fall initially. However, the equilibrium value of the capital
stock is only determined by exogenous variables. Therefore, in later periods the
growth rates are higher than on the reference path with unchanged preferences.
Since the capital endowment is lower the wage rates are lower than on the ref-
erence path with unchanged preferences. The decline of the interest rate to its
equilibrium value is slower. Nevertheless, capital income is lower, mirroring the
lower wage rate.8
The equilibrium value of the capital stock remains unchanged. But the
structure of expenditures changes slightly, resulting in higher environmental
quality and a higher utility level. The apparent discrepancy between small
changes in the private expenditure structure and comparatively high utility gains
due to a formidable increase in the quality of nature is caused by the external
eﬀects that each household creates by its change of behavior. The following
table illustrates the changes of equilibrium variable values in dependence on the
change of preferences.
Table 3.2: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.75→ 0.74 −0.002 0.020 5.402 0.192
0.75→ 0.70 −0.010 0.105 28.547 1.668
0.75→ 0.60 −0.033 0.367 99.867 10.585
0.75→ 0.50 −0.067 0.733 199.602 29.004
3.2 Numerical Results in a Planned Economy
In the following we look at the eﬀects of the same type of shock in a planned
economy. The benevolent dictator is not able to anticipate the preference shock,
but his immediate reaction ensures that the economy will be on the long-run
optimal path at once. Again we will illustrate the behavior of the system for a
small change of the preference variable from 0.75 to 0.74.
8Note that in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function the ratio of wage and capital
income is determined by the distribution parameter in the production function. Here, the
parameter value of δ = 0.5 ensures equal shares of the production factors.
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Figure 3.7: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 in a planned economy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 3.8: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 in a planned economy: growth rate
of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 3.9: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 in a planned economy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
Since the equilibrium capital stock depends only on exogenous parameters,
its time path diﬀers not much from the path in the market solution. The ma-
jor diﬀerence is in the speed of convergence.9 The planned economy converges
faster than the market economy. The changes of consumption and environmen-
tal expenditures in t = 0 are now clearly visible. Needless to say, the reason
for the bigger dimension of these changes is the consideration of the positive
external eﬀects that are associated directly with environmental expenditures
and indirectly with less pollution since consumption is reduced. Consequently,
the environmental quality is much higher. Note that there is no increase of con-
sumption in t = 0; even in the case of a small change of preferences consumption
falls.10 The percentage changes of variables in t = 0 are given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences in a planned economy
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.75→ 0.74 −1.255 2.911 3.802 5.814
0.75→ 0.70 −6.292 14.580 18.947 33.288
0.75→ 0.60 −19.000 43.961 56.473 144.736
0.75→ 0.50 −31.890 73.708 93.717 367.630
9Here speed of convergence means the possibility to close a gap between an initial value
and a target level of a certain variable, i.e. in our case capital stock. The easiest way to
evaluate the speed of convergence is a comparison of growth rates: relatively high growth
rates at the beginning and low growth rates at the end of the considered period indicate a
high speed of convergence, provided that the variable converges at all.
10For a comparison with the case of an unregulated economy see Table 3.1.
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The planner takes the external eﬀects into account, hence the attained utility
level is higher than in the market solution. The time paths of the growth
rates as well as of wage and interest rate and capital income reflect the faster
convergence of the planned economy. Compared with the market solution, in a
planned economy the changes of the equilibrium values of variables are bigger.
Table 3.4: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.75→ 0.74 −1.266 2.897 3.793 5.802
0.75→ 0.70 −6.339 14.506 18.894 33.216
0.75→ 0.60 −19.107 43.722 56.288 144.385
0.75→ 0.50 −32.025 73.283 93.372 366.624
Again, three figures illustrate the behavior of the system after the preference
change for the case of the most severe shock. The main diﬀerences of the market
solution are (1) the degree of change of the expenditure structure, (2) the degree
of change of natural quality and subsequently utility, and (3) the attained level
of natural quality and utility. Table 3.5 compares the equilibrium values of the
market and the planned economy. The behavior of the system over time does
not change qualitatively, hence all arguments given in the previous section apply
accordingly.11
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Figure 3.10: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50 in a planned economy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
11Note that the "flat" curves of consumption and environmental expenditures have the same
shape as the equivalent curves in Figure 3.4. The diﬀerent scale makes them look flat.
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Figure 3.11: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50 in a planned economy: growth rate
of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 3.12: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.50 in a planned economy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
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Table 3.5: Equilibrium values of variables for the unregulated and
the planned economy
α c s N U
0.75 229.181 20.819 141.617 170.866
unregulated 0.74 229.176 20.824 149.266 171.194
economy 0.70 229.159 20.841 182.044 173.716
0.60 229.104 20.896 283.045 188.951
0.50 229.028 20.972 424.286 220.424
0.75 173.973 76.027 95476 708.072
optimal 0.74 171.771 78.229 99097 749.152
solution 0.70 162.945 87.056 113515 943.268
0.60 140.732 109.268 149218 1730.42
0.50 118.258 131.742 184624 3304.03
3.3 Numerical Results with an Optimal Environmental
Policy
The decentralized economy attains the optimal equilibrium if two external eﬀects
are internalized. First we have to correct the negative external eﬀect of pollution
by taxing consumption, second we have to internalize the positive external eﬀect
of environmental expenditures by a subsidy. Moreover, a combination of both
instruments can be adjusted in a way that a balanced budget of the government
is reached in the long-run equilibrium. For simplicity we assume constant tax
and subsidy rates.12 Consequently, in the short run a budget surplus or deficit
is possible.
Again we assume that the preference change is unanticipated. But after the
preferences are changed, the tax and subsidy rates are adjusted immediately.13
A change of the preference parameter to 0.74, 0.7, 0.6 and 0.5 requires an
increase in the tax rate of about 4.214%, 22.245%, 77.615% and 154.770%,
respectively. The simultaneous change of the subsidy rate is rather small; it
is equal to −0.0016%, −0.0085%, −0.0298% and −0.0597%, respectively. But
since the subsidy rate is nearly equal to 1, the eﬀect of the decrease of the
subsidy rate is overcompensated by the decrease of consumption due to the
12The ideal first-best policy in this dynamic model is simply unrealistic. It would imply a
permanent adjustment of tax and subsidy rates if the economy is out of the steady state equi-
librium. In this case the time path of variables would be equivalent to the path derived in the
model of the planned economy. However, prohibitively high transaction costs should prevent
the implementation of this policy. An alternative policy to the combination of instruments
used here is a constant tax rate with subsidies depending on the momentary tax revenue.
Theoretically, the budget of the government would be balanced in the long and in the short
run. But given that policy there exists a set of initial points without trajectories converging to
the equilibrium that are consistent with the first order conditions. As a consequence, corner
solutions of the optimization problem have to be considered. For the sake of simplicity we
abandon a deeper discussion of this problem.
13The consequences of delays in the adjustment process are discussed in section 5.
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higher tax rate; the overall eﬀect is a shift of expenditures from consumption to
environmental expenditures.
The overall picture is very much alike the one we have drawn for the planned
economy. Naturally, the equilibrium values are equal to the values given in Table
3.5. The major diﬀerence to the models introduced previously appears to be
the considerable increase in the speed of convergence. This is caused by the
assumption of constant tax and subsidy rates. In the early periods the rates
are simply too high. A comparison of Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.8 illustrates this
fact using the trajectories of the growth rates and of utility.
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Figure 3.13: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy: growth rate of
assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
The magnitude of the jumps in the variable values in t = 0 is comparable
to the changes in the planned economy. Again, the remaining diﬀerences to
the model of the planned economy can be explained with the too high tax and
subsidy rates in t = 0.
Table 3.6: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences with an optimal policy
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.75→ 0.74 −1.238 2.931 3.819 5.833
0.75→ 0.70 −6.219 14.678 19.028 33.393
0.75→ 0.60 −18.856 44.238 56.716 145.172
0.75→ 0.50 −31.729 74.149 94.117 368.744
The budget cash flow is very small and remains well below 0.5% of the
tax revenue or subsidy payments in all examined cases (see Table 3.7). In
t = 0, tax revenue and subsidy payments increase. Nevertheless, the budget
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cash flow decreases slightly due to the change in the expenditure structure.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the change of the budget cash flow over time for a shift
of the preference parameter from 0.75 to 0.74.
Table 3.7: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
and change after shock in absolute values
∆α
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B ∆T |t=0 ∆S|t=0 ∆B|t=0
0.75→ 0.74 2071.18 2060.98 10.202 2.184 2.186 −0.0018
0.75→ 0.70 2202.76 2192.57 10.194 10.933 10.942 −0.0085
0.75→ 0.60 2533.77 2523.60 10.170 32.946 32.968 −0.0216
0.75→ 0.50 2868.39 2858.25 10.144 55.205 55.236 −0.0318
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Figure 3.14: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy: budget cash
flow
4 Paint It Black: Increasing Preferences for Con-
sumption
In this section we want to analyze a change of preferences towards consumption.
Although the "greening" of preferences dominates without doubt the discussion,
a change of preferences that leads to more consumption and less environmental
protection is at least in some countries a realistic description of the state of
aﬀairs. Especially the adoption of technologies that make more consumption
possible but escalate the pressure on environmental capacities are prominent
examples.14
14China can be taken as an example: Over the last 15 years the average growth rate has
been 10.1% per year. Despite eﬀorts by the government to cope with the environmental
22
There is an obvious choice for the starting points and the intensity of pref-
erence changes: To make comparisons possible we will analyze changes of the
preference parameter from 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, and 0.74 to 0.75. That mirrors the
parameter changes in the previous section.
4.1 Numerical Results for an Unregulated Economy
As expected, in the case of a change of the preference parameter from 0.74 to
0.75 the changes of variables in t = 0 are small. The exception is - as in the
model with greening preferences - the jump of the natural quality. A comparison
of Tables 3.1 and 4.1 reveals the same dimension of the changes of variables -
naturally with inverted algebraic signs.
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Figure 4.1: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75: assets, consumption, environmental
expenditures and environmental quality
deterioration Chinese cities reach levels of air pollution that are among the worst in the
world, energy intensity is 20% higher than the OECD average and about a third of the water
resources are severly polluted (OECD, 2006). See also Liu and Diamond (2005) and World
Bank (2007).
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Figure 4.2: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75: growth rate of assets, consumption
and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 4.3: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income
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Table 4.1: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.74→ 0.75 −0.0098 −0.0345 −5.135 −0.204
0.70→ 0.75 −0.0453 −0.1736 −22.246 −1.699
0.60→ 0.75 −0.1104 −0.5456 −50.031 −9.714
0.50→ 0.75 −0.1467 −0.9944 −66.686 −22.685
Again we want to illustrate the behavior of the system by assuming an
extreme case of a change of the preference parameter from 0.50 to 0.75. At
the same time we show the trajectories without most of the periods before the
change happens.
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Figure 4.4: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75: assets, consumption, environmental
expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 4.5: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75: growth rate of assets, consumption
and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 4.6: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75: wage rate, interest rate, relation
between wage and interest rate, and capital income
Despite the decrease of the environmental quality there is no increase of
consumption in the first periods after t = 0. The explanation is analogical to
the explanation given in paragraph 3.1: Here, it is optimal to increase the speed
of convergence of the economy in the next periods. Therefore, the growth rate
of assets suddenly increases indicating a sudden increase of the saving rates.
The result is an initial decrease not only of eco-friendly expenditures but also
of consumption. Since the equilibrium value of the capital is unchanged, after
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a while the growth rate of assets has to be lower compared to the rate in an
economy without a change of preferences. The jump of the growth rate of assets
is accompanied by jumps of the growth rates of consumption and environment-
friendly expenditures. The households expect higher income in the future and
react with an increase of total expenditures.
The increase of the amount of capital in the production results in an increase
of the wage rate and of capital income. At the same time we observe a faster
decrease of the interest rate since capital approaches faster its equilibrium value.
Table 4.2 illustrates the change of the equilibrium values of variables. The
small gains from an increase of consumption is overcompensated by the losses
due to the external eﬀects of the reduced environment-friendly expenditures
resulting in an remarkable decrease of the attainable utility level. The absolute
values of the changes of equilibrium values are comparable to the changes in the
case of greening preferences (see Table 3.2).
Table 4.2: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.74→ 0.75 0.002 −0.019 −5.125 −0.191
0.70→ 0.75 0.010 −0.105 −22.207 −0.641
0.60→ 0.75 0.033 −0.365 −49.967 −9.572
0.50→ 0.75 0.067 −0.727 −66.622 −22.483
4.2 Numerical Results in a Planned Economy
In this model, the benevolent planner does not act paternalistically, i.e. he
changes his policy after a change of the preference parameter even if this results
in a decrease of the utility level. The following figures illustrate the case of a
small change of the preference parameter from 0.74 to 0.75.
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Figure 4.7: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 in a planned economy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 4.8: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 in a planned economy: growth rate
of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 4.9: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 in a planned economy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
Table 4.3: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences in a planned economy
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.74→ 0.75 1.271 −2.829 −3.663 −5.494
0.70→ 0.75 6.714 −12.724 −15.929 −24.974
0.60→ 0.75 23.456 −30.537 −36.091 −59.140
0.50→ 0.75 46.822 −42.432 −48.378 −78.616
Again we can notice that the dimension of the changes in t = 0 is comparable
to the case of greening preferences (see Table 3.3). Unlike in the market economy
the change in the expenditure structure is now visible to the naked eye. To unveil
the changes in the growth rates and other variables we use again the scenario
with a dramatic change of the preference parameter from 0.50 to 0.75 leaving
out the periods before t = −1.
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Figure 4.10: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75 in a planned economy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 4.11: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75 in a planned economy: growth rate
of assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 4.12: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75 in a planned economy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
As in the case of greening preferences the planned economy converges faster
than the particular market economy. An additional similarity is the dimension
of the changes of the equilibrium values - of course with changed algebraic signs.
A comparison of Tables 3.4 and 4.4 illustrates this result.
Table 4.4: Percentage change of equilibrium values of variables
following a change of preferences
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.74→ 0.75 1.282 −2.815 −3.654 −5.484
0.70→ 0.75 6.768 −12.668 −15.892 −24.934
0.60→ 0.75 23.620 −30.421 −36.016 −59.081
0.50→ 0.75 47.113 −42.291 −48.286 −78.570
Note that the equilibrium values of variables for the unregulated economy
and the planned economy are identical to the values given in Table 3.5.
4.3 Numerical Results with an Optimal Environmental
Policy
As in the previous chapter here, too, we want to introduce an optimal tax that
ensures an optimal expenditure structure and a balanced budget in equilibrium.
The following figures illustrate the case of a small change of the preference
parameter from 0.74 to 0.75. As in the model of the planned economy, the
changes in the expenditure structure are clearly visible. The major diﬀerence is
again the apparent higher speed of convergence in comparison to the planned
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economy as well as the market economy.15 Table 4.5 shows that the changes
of variable values in t = 0 are very much alike to the changes in the planned
economy. Note that given the optimal policy as defined above the changes in
equilibrium values are equal to the changes given in Table 4.4 for the planned
economy.
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Figure 4.13: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 with optimal policy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
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Figure 4.14: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 with optimal policy: growth rate of
assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
15See Figure 4.14 in comparison to Figure 4.8 for the planned economy and Figure 4.2 for
the market economy.
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Figure 4.15: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 with optimal policy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
Table 4.5: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 following a
change of preferences with an optimal policy
∆α ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
0.74→ 0.75 1.254 −2.848 −3.678 −5.511
0.70→ 0.75 6.632 −12.799 −15.986 −25.033
0.60→ 0.75 23.238 −30.670 −36.190 −59.212
0.50→ 0.75 46.476 −42.578 −48.485 −78.666
As in the models with greening preferences the budget cash flow is almost
negligible. As can be expected the changes of tax revenue, the subsidy expen-
ditures and the budget cash flow in t = 0 have the same dimension but the
opposite algebraic sign.
Table 4.6: Tax revenues, subsidies and budget cash flow over time
and change after shock in absolute values
∆α
R 15
−15 T
R 15
−15 S
R 15
−15B ∆T |t=0 ∆S|t=0 ∆B|t=0
0.74→ 0.75 2078.22 2068.47 9.755 −2.184 −2.186 0.00185
0.70→ 0.75 2234.36 2226.28 8.086 −10.933 −10.942 0.00852
0.60→ 0.75 2606.36 2601.25 5.108 −32.947 −32.968 0.02165
0.50→ 0.75 2964.42 2961.03 3.385 −55.205 −55.236 0.03177
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Figure 4.16: Change of α from 0.74 to 0.75 with optimal policy: budget cash
flow
A closer look at the case with a change of the preference parameter from 0.50
to 0.75 shows that the trajectories in the model with an optimal policy bear a
striking resemblance to the trajectories in the model of the planned economy -
except for the growth rates. As a consequence the economy converges faster if
constant taxes and subsidies are used to internalize the external eﬀects.16
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Figure 4.17: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75 with optimal policy: assets,
consumption, environmental expenditures and environmental quality
16Compare especially Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: Change of α from 0.50 to 0.75 with optimal policy: growth rate of
assets, consumption and environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 4.19: Change of α from 0.5 to 0.75 with optimal policy: wage rate,
interest rate, relation between wage and interest rate, and capital income
5 Big Sleep: A Delay in the Adjustment of Pol-
icy Measures
In contrast to most theoretical models the adjustment process in the real world
usually takes time. First, a change of preferences does not happen over night.17
17An exception are accidents that can change preferences in no time at all.
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The possible reasons mentioned in the introduction are connected to slow processes
of knowledge creation, distribution, acquisition and processing. Second, the
changed preferences are not immediately reflected in a changed policy. Some-
times only an election provides an opportunity for a modification of the political
orientation. And even a new government is generally not able to change very
much very fast. The delayed adjustment of policy after a preference change
is especially important if we look at the introduction or abolition of policy in-
struments. Nevertheless, this is a bit mitigated if we discuss the adjustment
of instruments that are already established. Usually this adjustment can be
realized more easily and at a faster pace. But there is still time necessary to
change the preferences of a large proportion of the population after an initial
start-up. Last but not least we should point out that also the administrative
implementation of policy measures takes time.
The previous paragraph shows that there is no qualitative diﬀerence between
models dealing with diﬀerent dimensions of shocks. Therefore, in the following
the point of time of the shock will be "earlier": We assume a change of the
preference parameter if the assets attain 95% of the equilibrium value. The
only motive behind this modification of the model used in the previous chapters
is to make the consequences of policy measures better visible. We abstain from
an extensive discussion of the case of a change of preferences towards more
consumption since in the previous chapter we have shown that this case is more
or less a mirror image of greening preferences.
Note that long-dashed trajectories correspond to a reference scenario without
preference change, the short-dashed trajectories to a reference scenario with
preference change but without adjustment of the policy instruments.
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Figure 5.1: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy and a lagged
adjustment after 3 periods: assets, consumption, environmental expenditures
and environmental quality
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Figure 5.2: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy and a lagged
adjustment after 3 periods: growth rate of assets, consumption and
environmental expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 5.3: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy and a lagged
adjustment after 3 periods: wage rate. interest rate, relation between wage and
interest rate, and capital income
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Figure 5.4: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.74 with optimal policy and a lagged
adjustment after 3 periods: budget cash flow
The figures show the consequences of the adjustment of the policy instru-
ments. The changes right after the shock are similar to the changes in the case
of an unregulated economy (see Section 3). But the adjustment after three
periods is accompanied by a perceptible decrease of consumption and environ-
mental expenditures as well as natural quality. Consequently, utility decreases,
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too. Therefore, incentives to delay or prevent necessary adjustments of policy
measures exist even if politicians are only slightly myopic.18
In the long run, adjustment ensures a sustainable path. Without adjustment,
overaccumulation of capital takes place and the utility level decreases. Due to
the distortions induced by incorrect tax and subsidy rates the system is no
longer on a stable path towards a steady-state equilibrium.19
6 On the Edge: Errors in the Adjustment Process
In the previous section, the adjustment after a preference change was delayed.
There is another possible consequence of the unpredictability of changes of pref-
erences. Errors in the determination of the necessary extend of tax and subsidy
changes are unavoidable if there are certain diﬃculties in the process of obtain-
ing and processing of information.20 Due to these errors the economy will not
reach the new optimal steady state. In the following we assume an error in the
determination of the optimal tax rate. However, the government is able to deter-
mine the subsidy rate that guarantees a balanced budget in the long run. This
implies either diﬀerent types of diﬃculties in the determination of tax rates and
subsidy rates or a higher flexibility in the determination of expenditures than
in the determination of revenues. Table 6.1 shows the equilibrium values after
a change of the preference parameter α to 0.6 depending on the seize of the
percentage error ε in the determination of the optimal tax rate. Note that the
equilibrium of the capital stock is - as is always in this model - unaﬀected by
the preference change and the tax rate. As in the previous section we leave out
the case of a change of preferences towards higher consumption.
Table 6.1: Equilibrium values after a greening of preferences to
α = 0.6 and an error ε in the determination of the tax rate
18This supports results from a previous study about consequences of delayed adjustments
in the case of productivity shocks (Barthel, 2007).
19Note that in this section the deviation from the optimal tax is much bigger than the
assumed error in Section 6. Therefore, the distortion is big enough to cause the unstability.
However, the rather small deviation of at most ±5% results in a stable equilibrium in the
sorrounding of the optimal equilibrium.
20The problem of the determination of the correct tax and subsidy rate is also discussed in
Barthel (2005).
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ε in % c s N U
−5.0 143.873 106.127 144216 1729.74
−2.5 142.285 107.715 146746 1730.26
−1.0 141.350 108.650 148236 1730.40
−0.1 140.794 109.206 149120 1730.42
±0 140.732 109.268 149218 1730.42
+0.1 140.671 109.329 149315 1730.42
+1.0 140.121 109.879 150190 1730.40
+2.5 139.213 110.787 151633 1730.27
+5.0 137.726 112.274 153993 1729.81
An error in the determination of the tax rate of −5% - implying a tax rate
that reaches only 95% of the optimal tax - results in an increased consumption by
+2.232% and reduced environmental expenditures by −2.874%. And although
natural quality is reduced by −3.352%, utility decreases only by −0.039%. Sim-
ilarily, a tax rate that is too high (+5%) leads to lower consumption by −2.136%
and increased environmental expenditures by +2.751%. Consequently, natural
quality is higher than in the optimal point by +3.200%. Again, utility decreases
by only −0.035%. The utility loss due to reasonable errors is rather small. This
is caused by the compensation within the system. The utility loss due to too
much pollution as a result of a tax rate below the optimal level is nearly com-
pensated by the utility gain caused by higher consumption. If the tax rate is too
high the decreased consumption is compensated by the lower pollution. As in
the model discussed in Barthel (2007a), the utility gains due to the introduction
of environmental taxes are remarkably higher than utility gains by an adjust-
ment of environmental instruments. That implies low incentives to adjust such
a system if transaction costs are high. On the other hand the utility changes are
small even for noticeable changes of the tax rate. If the transaction costs are
low the incentives to adjust the tax rates are not diminished by considerations
with regard to a possible decrease of consumption.
The dynamic behavior of the system is shown in the next figures. We assume
a change of the preference parameter α from 0.75 to 0.60 and an error in the
determination of the tax rate of −5%.21 Again we leave out the time path of
the variables for the periods between −15 and −1.
21This implies an increase of the tax rate by only 68.735% instead of 77.615% (compare
Section 3.3)
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Figure 6.1: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.60 with an error in the adjustment of
the tax rate of −5%: assets, consumption, environmental expenditures and
environmental quality
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Figure 6.2: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.60 with an error in the adjustment of
the tax rate of −5%: growth rate of assets, consumption and environmental
expenditures, and utility level
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Figure 6.3: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.60 with an error in the adjustment of
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Figure 6.4: Change of α from 0.75 to 0.60 with an error in the adjustment of
the tax rate of −5%: budget cash flow
A comparison with the figures in the third section shows that there is no
qualitative diﬀerence in the trajectories between the model with correct and the
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model with incorrect tax rates. Of course, the initial changes in t = 0 and the
equilibrium are diﬀerent. Table 6.2 shows the initial changes in dependence of
the adjustment error.
Table 6.2: Percentage change of variables in t = 0 after a greening
of preferences to α = 0.6 and an error ε in the determination of the
tax rate
ε in % ∆c ∆s ∆N ∆U
−5.0 −17.044 40.090 51.464 145.077
−2.5 −17.960 42.186 54.121 145.150
−1.0 −18.500 43.422 55.685 145.169
−0.1 −18.821 44.156 56.614 145.172
±0 −18.856 44.238 56.716 145.172
+0.1 −18.892 44.318 56.819 145.172
+1.0 −19.209 45.045 57.737 145.167
+2.5 −19.733 46.243 59.251 145.149
+5.0 −20.590 48.207 61.730 145.083
The deviations from the optimal initial change correspond closely to the
deviations of the equilibrium values of the variables. With an error of −5%,
consumption in t = 0 is +2.232% higher than without this error, environmen-
tal expenditures are −2.876% lower. Consequently, natural quality is −3.351%
lower, but again the utility level is nearly unaﬀected and decreases by −0.039%.
Similarly, a tax exceeding the optimal rate by +5% results in initial consump-
tion −2.137% below the optimal level, increased environmental expenditures by
+2.752%, consequently a natural quality +3.199% above the optimal value and
a decrease in utility by −0.036%. This implies a nearly unchanged speed of
convergence.
The comparison with the path without the preference change shows the same
pattern of deviations as can be seen in section 3.22 Therefore we can apply the
same arguments as discussed in Section 3.1.
7 Summary
The present paper builds on previous work. In Barthel (2005) the impact of
the elasticity of substitution was in the focus of the analysis. Diﬀerent environ-
mental policy instruments were examined in a similar model. In a follow up,
consequences of productivity shocks and capital depreciation are investigated
(Barthel, 2007). Here we concentrate on shocks due to changes of preferences
of the individuals.
In a model with pollution as a side eﬀect of consumption, preferences of
households shift over night. The changes are caused by exogenous shocks and
22Compare Figures 3.10-3.12 with Figures 6.1-6.3.
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can induce "greener" or "blackened" expenditure patterns. Models of an unreg-
ulated economy, an economy controlled by a benevolent planner and regulated
by a system of taxes on consumption and subsidies on environmental expendi-
tures are calculated. The combination of taxes and subsidies internalizes the
negative external eﬀect caused by consumption and the positive external eﬀect
induced by environmental expenditures. Furthermore, we have assumed that
the budget of the government is balanced in the long run. In another set of
models the policy measures are adjusted with a delay. This delay is caused by
the time-consuming political and administrative processes.
"Greening" of preferences is modeled as a sudden unanticipated change of
the preference parameter of the utility function in favor of environmental qual-
ity. In an unregulated economy, consumption and environmental expenditures
increase. The reason is a perceptible decrease of the growth rates. The higher
pollution is compensated by the relatively dominating increase in environmental
expenditures; consequently quality of nature and, hence, utility increase. In the
not-really-long run, the growth rates are slightly higher than in the reference
case without preference changes. Naturally, all growth rates approach zero in
the steady state - the really long run - since we have no growth if the assets -
and therefore the capital stock - attain the exogenously determined steady state
level.
In a planned economy and in the case of optimal environmental policy we can
observe the similar pattern of variable changes. The main diﬀerence is the speed
of convergence - the planned economy and especially the economy regulated by
taxes and subsidies converge faster. In the case of the combination of optimal
taxes and subsidies, the budget cash flow is small and approaches zero in the
long run.
An increase of the preference parameter induces a higher preference for goods
consumption. Consequently, the observable variable changes are diﬀerent. Ex-
penditures decrease after the shock in favor of a higher speed of convergence.
A more prominent decrease of environmental expenditures induces a lower en-
vironmental quality despite the decreasing pollution due to less consumption.
Hence, the utility level decreases. Again, regulation implies a higher speed of
convergence to the new steady state.
If the political and administrative processes take time, the adjustment of pol-
icy measures may be lagged. The eﬀects of changes in the preference structure
are then separated highly visible from the impact of the adjustment of tax and
subsidy rates. Hence, the incentives to prevent the adjustment are apparent.
However, in the long run adjustment ensures sustainability of the environmental
policy.
To round oﬀ the analysis we provide an investigation of consequences of
errors in the adjustment process. As long as the error is of reasonable size,
the trajectories of variables are shifted. A tax rate that exceeds the optimal
level results in higher environmental expenditures and natural quality but lower
consumption. If the tax rate is too low, consumption is higher than in the opti-
mum and environmental expenditures and natural quality are lower. However,
in both cases the utility level remains nearly unaﬀected.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Solution of the Household’s Optimization Problem in
the Basic Model
The Hamiltonian for the household i is:
JH = U
¡
ci, N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
+ θ(a) ·
¡
r · a+ w − ci − s(N)i
¢
(28)
The first-order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂ci = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = θ(a) (29)
2. ∂J∂s(N)i
= 0
UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a) (30)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · r (31)
The transversality condition23 is given by:
lim
t→∞
£
θ(a) · a
¤
= 0
which is equivalent to:
lim
t→∞
£
e−ρ·t · a¤ = 0
From the conditions (29) and (30) we can derive:
Uc = UN · (NE ·ES −NP · PC)
Derivation of the conditions (29) and (30) with respect to time yields:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ3 · c˙+ ξ4 · s˙
with
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN · n ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UcN · PC ·NP · (n+ 1) + UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡
(UNN ·NE ·NP + UN ·NEP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ4 ≡
¡
UN ·ESS ·NE + UNN ·E2S ·N2E + UN ·E2S ·NEE
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
23 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 503-508).
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Therefore, the control variables change according to:
c˙ =
ξ4 − ξ2
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ3 · ξ2
· (ρ− r) (32)
s˙ =
ξ1 − ξ3
ξ1 · ξ4 − ξ2 · ξ3
· (ρ− r) (33)
8.2 Solution of the Planner’s Optimization Problem
The Hamiltonian can now be written as:
JP = U
¡
c,N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
+ θ(a) ·
¡
f (a)− c− s(N)
¢
(34)
The first order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂c = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC · n = θ(a) (35)
2. ∂J∂s(N) = 0
UN ·NE ·ES · n = θ(a) (36)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · fa (37)
From equations (35) and (36) follows:
Uc = UN · n · (NE ·ES −NP · PC)
Derivation of conditions (35) and (36) with respect to time yields:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ2 · c˙+ ξ3 · s˙
with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
∙
UN ·
¡
NP · PCC + P 2C ·NPP
¢
+UNN ·N2P · P 2C
¸
· n2 + 2 · UcN · PC ·NP · n
UN ·NE ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN + UNN ·NP · PC · n
UN
+
NEP · PC · n
NE
ξ3 ≡
UNN ·NE ·ES · n
UN
+
NEE ·ES · n
NE
+
ESS · n
ES
It follows:
ρ− fa = ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙
= ξ2 · c˙+ ξ3 · s˙
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Here, the growth rates are given by:
a˙ = f (a)− c− s(N) (38)
c˙ =
ξ2 − ξ3
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· (ρ− fa) (39)
s˙ =
ξ2 − ξ1
ξ22 − ξ1 · ξ3
· (ρ− fa) (40)
Using the specifications the short hand equations simplify to:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc +
¡
UNN · P 2C − UN · PCC
¢ · n2 − 2 · UcN · PC · n
UN ·ES · n
ξ2 ≡
UcN − UNN · PC · n
UN
ξ3 ≡
UNN ·E2S + UN ·ESS
UN ·ES · n
8.3 Solution of the Household’s Optimization Problemwith
Repayment of Tax Revenues as a Subsidy
The Hamiltonian for the household i is:
JH = U
¡
ci, N
¡
E (S) , P (C) , N
¢
, φ
¢
(41)
+θ(a) ·
¡
r · ai + wi − (1 + d) · ci − (1− p) · s(N)i
¢
The first-order conditions are:
1. ∂J∂ci = 0
Uc + UN ·NP · PC = θ(a) · (1 + d) (42)
2. ∂J∂s(N)i
= 0
UN ·NE ·ES = θ(a) · (1− p) (43)
3. ∂J∂a = ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a)
ρ · θ(a) − θ˙(a) = θ(a) · r (44)
Again, we can derive:
Uc = UN ·
µ
1 + d
1− p ·NE ·ES −NP · PC
¶
From the derivation conditions (42) and (43) with respect to time follows:
θ˙(a)
θ(a)
= ξ1 · c˙+ ξ2 · s˙+ ξ3 · d˙
= ξ4 · c˙+ ξ5 · s˙+ ξ6 · p˙
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with:
ξ1 ≡
Ucc + UN · n ·
¡
NP · PCC +NPP · P 2C
¢
+UNN · P 2C ·N2P · n+ UcN ·NP · PC · (n+ 1)
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE ·ES
ξ2 ≡
((UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC + UcN ·NE) · n
1+d
1−p · UN ·NE
ξ3 ≡ −
1
1 + d
ξ4 ≡
(UN ·NEP + UNN ·NE ·NP ) · PC · n+ UcN ·NE
UN ·NE
ξ5 ≡
¡
UN ·NE ·ESS + UNN ·N2E ·E2S + UN ·NEE ·E2S
¢ · n
UN ·NE ·ES
ξ6 ≡
1
1− p
This can be rewritten as:
c˙ =
(ξ5 − ξ2) · (ρ− r)− ξ3 · ξ5 · d˙+ ξ2 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
s˙ =
(ξ1 − ξ4) · (ρ− r) + ξ3 · ξ4 · d˙− ξ1 · ξ6 · p˙
ξ1 · ξ5 − ξ4 · ξ2
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